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The Relevance of Intuitions in Experimental
Philosophy Surveys
Alexander Lidiak, Philosophy
Faculty Sponsor: Nancy Matchett
Experimental philosophy (X-Phi) is a novel approach to philosophy, which surveys
people’s intuitions in order to support or undermine philosophical theories. It is a major
assumption of X-Phi that these surveys accurately capture people’s intuitive responses
to philosophical issues. The central purpose of this research is to investigate whether
this is a safe assumption. One of the most influential X-Phi surveys discovered a
surprising asymmetry in people’s “intuitions” about intentionality (Knobe, 2003). In my
project, I distribute the same survey questions but provide a philosophical definition of
intentionality to participants in advance. It will be investigated how the survey results
change if participants are given something other than their intuitions to rely on. I
hypothesize that the responses will be more symmetrical in my survey than in Knobe’s.
If this hypothesis is true, this may support the claim that most people rely on
ambiguous definitions of philosophical concepts and that X-Phi surveys like Knobe’s
are accurate evidence of people’s intuitions. Alternatively, it could be evidence that
critically thinking improves consistency. If the survey responses show asymmetry even
after defining intentionality, this may indicate that the participants either ignored the
definition, have intuitions so strong that they override the definition, or committed a
performance error in using the concept of intentionality. In which case, the many uses
of survey data in X-Phi may not be accurate representations of people’s intuitions at all,
but could be evidence of differences in the use of concepts, i.e., the ways in which
people reason.
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